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Abstract For various IT systems security is considered a key quality factor. In particular,
it might be crucial for video surveillance systems, as their goal is to provide continuous
protection of critical infrastructure and other facilities. Risk assessment is an important
activity in security management; it aims at identifying assets, threats and vulnerabilities,
analysis of implemented countermeasures and their effectiveness in mitigating risks. This
paper discusses an application of a new risk assessment method, in which risk calculation
is based on Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) to a complex automated video surveillance sys-
tem. FCMs are used to capture dependencies between assets and FCM based reasoning is
applied to aggregate risks assigned to lower-level assets (e.g. cameras, hardware, software
modules, communications, people) to such high level assets as services, maintained data
and processes. Lessons learned indicate, that the proposed method is an efficient and low-
cost approach, giving instantaneous feedback and enabling reasoning on effectiveness of
security system.
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1 Introduction
For various IT systems security is considered a key quality factor. In particular, it might be
crucial for video surveillance systems, as their goal is to provide continuous protection of
critical infrastructure and other important facilities.
Risk assessment is a key process in the management of IT systems security. It
can be considered an extensive study of assets, threats and vulnerabilities, likelihoods
of their occurrences, potential losses and theoretical effectiveness of security measures
[24]. Several risk assessment processes are defined by over 15 standards or methods
[18], including most popular: ISO/IEC 27005 [31], NIST 800-30 [46] and CRAMM
[17]. The standards, apart of defining risk scoring methods, specify organizational
foundations for performing risk assessment in the broader context of IT security risk
management.
Even a quick research [25, 33] can indicate that automated video surveillance systems
are potentially exposed to risks of various types. Firstly, they use a number of technologies:
computer vision, networking and big data for video storage. Secondly, they rely on several
hardware elements: cameras, network infrastructure or servers. Finally, they may integrate
components complying various standards.
There have been several attempts to provide design guidelines for video surveillance sys-
tems taking into consideration security issues [55]. Moreover, such systems may deploy
several mature multimedia protection technologies, as watermarking, encryption or finger-
printing [21]. Despite those facts, it seems that there is a significant lack of research on
overall assessment of IT security risk for this domain.
This paper discusses an application a new lightweight risk assessment method [60] to an
automated video surveillance system. The method consists in identifying assets and express-
ing dependencies between them in form of a Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM). Then, FCM
based reasoning is applied to aggregate risks assigned to lower-level assets (e.g. hardware,
software modules, communications, people) to such high level assets as services, maintained
data and processes.
The complete method description is given in the paper, as well as an assessment of
a relatively complex system comprising several detection modules, components imple-
menting human interfaces, databases and a workflow serving as an integration platform.
The subsequent assessment steps are discussed on a real example and their results are
discussed.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide an overview of risk assess-
ment methods. Section 3 introduces Fuzzy Cognitive Maps, followed by Section 4, in which
risk assessment methodology is described. Further, in Section 5 the analyzed system is pre-
sented, then in Section 6 application of the proposed risk assessment method is discussed.
Finally, Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
2 Related works
This section is divided into three subsections. The first gives an overview of risk assess-
ment methodologies. The second discusses modern automated video surveillance systems.
Finally, the last subsection provides the problem definition.
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2.1 Overview of risk assessment methodologies
According to [24, 51] security is the protection afforded to an information system in
order to preserve integrity of data and system functions, their availability, authenticity and
confidentiality.
Risk assessment has its roots in the nuclear power industry, where probabilistic mod-
els were built to analyze potentially catastrophic faults in nuclear power facilities [51]. In
1979 the National Bureau of Standards proposed the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) met-
ric [30] as applicable for non safety-critical systems. It defined risk as a sum of products
of frequencies of harmful events and induced losses expressed in dollars. This approach to
risk characterization influenced many methodologies and standards, e.g. CRAMM [17] or
recently NIST 800-30 [46]. In some frameworks the statistical term frequency is replaced by
likelihood or probability, loss by impact. Furthermore, as it is difficult to estimate absolute
values of probabilities and losses, ordinal scales (e.g.: low, medium, high) defining coarse
levels are used.
In spite of the popularity of the ALE metric, its application to the risk assessment is
considered problematic due to a cognitive bias in estimating likelihoods of threats [28], lack
of statistical data, difficulties in calculating losses and extremely high costs of the whole
process.
In numerous standards and methods listed in the ENISA Inventory [18], including most
popular: ISO/IEC 27005 [31], NIST 800-30 [46] and CRAMM [17], the risk assessment is
not only perceived as a method of estimating risks; it is rather considered a complex process
in the management of IT system security. Typically, it is built up of several activities, such
as identification of assets, threats and vulnerabilities, the likelihoods of their occurrences,
potential losses and the theoretical effectiveness of security measures. Hence, the standards,
apart of defining risk scoring methods, specify organizational foundations for performing
risk assessment in the broader context of IT security risk management.
Practical implementations of risk assessment and management include various
approaches. Integrated Business Risk-Management Frameworks e.g. SABSA [50] abstract
from technical details and embed IT security within a holistic business risk management
context. Valuation-Driven Methodologies ignore difficult to assess likelihoods and simply
recommend safeguards using as a sole criterion estimated values of assets. Scenario Analy-
sis Approaches focus on eliciting and evaluating scenarios compromising security. Finally,
Best Practices rely on standardized lists of safeguards eligible for given types of assets.
Parallel to business practice, the ongoing (mainly academic) efforts aiming at building
risk models going beyond ALE and applying them to real or hypothetical systems might
be observed. In several cases they were followed by proposals of methodologies or guide-
lines, often accompanied by dedicated interactive software packages. Furthermore, these
guidelines were frequently combined with modeling techniques that are widely applied in
reliability and safety engineering, such as Fault Trees, Event Trees, Markov Chains, and
FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis) [7, 52, 66]. These techniques provide a representa-
tion of system operations and undesirable events and a validation of the system safety level
[9, 12, 16, 42, 53].
Han, Yang and Chang described an expansible vulnerability model in order to qualita-
tively assess the security of an active network aiming at solving a problem that it is more
suited for an active network, than a traditional one [27]. Eom, Park and Han introduced
a risk assessment method based on asset valuation and quantification [19]. Baudrit and
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Dubios proposed a risk assessment method taking into account two types of uncertainty:
randomness and imprecision [6]. Sun, Srivastava, and Mork introduced a risk assessment
model based on Dempster-Shafer evidence reasoning [54]. Chen put forward a quantitative
hierarchical threat assessment model and a corresponding quantitative calculation method
exploiting the statistics of system attacks that occurred in the past [13]. Wang et. al. analyze
network security by using a probable attack graph generated on the basis of security case
reasoning, carrying out qualitative risk assessment for the network system mainly from an
attacker perspective [68].
Attack trees, proposed by Schneier [47], specify which combinations of adversarial
actions should be employed to compromise an asset (the goal of an attack). Hence, a tree
with AND-OR nodes represents several attack scenarios. As each tree node can be assigned
with various attributes: a probability, a cost of an adversarial action or a loss, various met-
rics can be calculated indicating the probability of success of a given attack and helping
to find potential vulnerabilities. An application of attack trees to assess security risks in
heterogeneous telecommunication networks was reported by Szpyrka, Jasiul et al. [56].
Lazzerini and Mkrtchyan [39] proposed a method using Extended Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
(E-FCMs) to analyze the relationships between risk factors and risks. E-FCMs are suggested
by Hagiwara [26] to represent causal relationships in a more natural way. The main differ-
ences between E-FCMs and conventional Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (discussed in Section 3)
are the following: E-FCMs have nonlinear membership functions, conditional weights, and
time delay weights.
2.2 Review of video-surveillance systems
Automated video surveillance is a complex technology combining recent developments in
computer vision, hardware (cameras, video storage), networking and data bases. It is applied
to protect various types of objects: state borders, industrial infrastructure, public areas,
buildings, hospitals, offices, malls and parking lots. Automated systems gradually displace
installations using solely human observers, as they are considered costly and ineffective.
Typical video analysis components include such functions as background maintenance,
object detection, classification, object tracking and activity (event) recognition [25]. More-
over, the detection software usually necessities in auxiliary configuration information about
an observed scene, e.g. definition of polygon shaped zones, crosslines, regions of interests,
etc.
Appearance of a recognized object within such region, its movement or partial overlap-
ping produces an alarm (event), which is further processed by other system components. In
particular it can be delivered to a system operator to bring his or her attention to a detected
suspicious situation.
Industrial video surveillance systems differ in alarm handling and detection capabilities
and, at the some time, publish very little information on algorithms used. We review some
of them to give an idea of their complexity and potential challenges for securing the systems
themselves.
The Bosch IVA (Intelligent Video Analysis) security system is a leader in this field [8].
It is a comprehensive solution designed for conducting intelligent video surveillance. IVA
includes alarm transmission subsystem and centralized management. Bosch VMS (Video
Management System) provides complete surveillance, management of video signals and
alarms handling. Alarms coming from IVA system are combined with general motion detec-
tion alarms. VMS system allows combining specific alarming conditions and ordering them
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according to their importance, resulting in possibly complex rules to manage emergency
scenarios.
IndigoVision company [29] provides tools supporting integration and management of
alarming systems. Its solutions include a centralized management of distributed monitoring
systems through automated handling of alarms detected anywhere in the supervised areas.
The system allows to define responsibilities for performing alarm responses, assigning them
to registered users, integration of alarm zones and reports creating .
VMS (Video Management System) system is developed by Mirasys Carbon company
[41]. It is highly scalable and provides efficient analysis tools for handling thousands of
video recorders and cameras. The system supports the centralized management of user
profiles, constant monitoring of system status and generation of alarms associated with
hardware failures. An important feature is the ability to define the procedures for handling
registration and reporting of alarms.
Axis Company offers and promotes decentralized systems, which perform essential cal-
culations on cameras [5]. A key feature of this approach is free of charge, open standard
to support network cameras (Axis network cameras VAPIX). This allows not only to cre-
ate own applications for intelligent video analysis, but simplifies also the development of a
surveillance system, as the standard includes ready-to-use solutions.
System from Securiton company [48] is equipped with functions of location and geo-
referenced positioning of objects and 3D technology. IPS-Outdoor is a high quality video
surveillance system for monitoring of people and objects in outdoor areas. IPS-Indoor
allows to track simultaneously up to 50 objects inside buildings and in outdoor areas and to
visualize objects’ trajectories, also on large maps (geo-referencing).
The Verint company [65] has developed Nextiva PSIMTM Actionable Intelligence system
that integrates a large number of detectors and automatically identify dangerous situations.
Solutions provided by PSIM platform are scalable and are based on an open architecture.
The software includes PSIM scenario generator that allows to define scenarios launched in
case of such events, as: explosion, flood, aggressive crowd behavior or gas leak. Execution
of procedures is controlled through control lists.
Detection of complex temporal scenarios was the goal of a system developed at INRIA
[67]. This system used VSIP platform for recognizing such people behaviors, as fighting
or vandalism in a subway scene observed by a single or multiple cameras. This work has
been performed in the framework of the European project ADVISOR [1], which aims at
building a generic environment facilitating integration of algorithms for video processing
and analysis. ADVISOR allows to flexibly combine and exchange various techniques at the
different stages of the video understanding process.
2.3 Problem definition
The paper has two goals. The first is to verify, whether a new method of risk assess-
ment, which was originally proposed for an e-health system [61], can be applied to a much
more complex system belonging to another domain. The developed, but still not deployed,
video surveillance system SIMPOZ (described in Section 5) seemed a perfect case, as the
method enables detecting vulnerable points and performing “what if” analysis related to
implemented countermeasures.
The second goal is more general. In spite of the fact, that the protection of video surveil-
lance systems seems to be an important issue, there is a significant lack of research devoted
to overall risk assessment of such systems. Hence, our intention was to propose a method
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of risk evaluation that would fit the needs of this domain. This is also the main contribution
of the paper.
Surprisingly, as mentioned above, just a few papers related to IT security of video surveil-
lance systems can be found. Several reasons to such situation can be given. Firstly, most
works are focused on surveillance tasks and not on threats that can be attributed to systems
themselves. Secondly, in most cases only certain aspects together with related technologies
are addressed, eg. privacy protection [11, 23, 49], camera tampering [15, 20], eavesdrop
protection [64] or forging video material [40]. Finally, for implemented systems or off-shelf
solutions it would be unreasonable to unveil their weak points and expose them to attacks.
In case of the SIMPOZ system we were in a privileged position, as we analyzed a prototype
system that has not been yet deployed in a working environment and indicated risks could
have been mitigated during the final transition.
A work by Karimaa [33] gives a systematic review to security problems for video surveil-
lance systems. The author divides their architecture into several layers: business, logic,
resource and access and discuss risks and solutions related to each layer. Main identified
challenges are related to heterogeneity, large volumes of data being transferred, protection
against eavesdroppers in communication over public networks, multiple security domains,
design of storage systems and user-friendliness of interfaces.
Xie and Ma [69] analyze a social public security video surveillance project in China and
discuss the risk management model based on a dynamic life cycle risk management theory.
With comprehensive analysis and identification of risk factors related to such projects, the
paper provides a basic risk identification table. Finally, the authors give the solutions to a
project risk for a discussed case study. However, the paper covers a wide area of topics,
while focusing more on project management than the risk assessment.
One of the aspects frequently covered in articles on security in video surveillance sys-
tems is privacy. The general conclusion of various reports is that giving up privacy does not
necessarily result in a greater security, and the greater security does not necessarily require
a loss of privacy [23, 49]. Various technologies that protect privacy in video surveillance
exist, but their implementations in current security systems have been limited compared to
those of surveillance technology. Referring to these reports, Cavallero discusses [11], how
recent advances in video surveillance threaten privacy and how state of art signal processing
technologies can protect privacy without risking security – some of those techniques have
been applied in the system presented in this paper. From the above review we may conclude
that well designed and selectively used video-surveillance systems are powerful tools for
physical object protection and monitoring. However, badly designed systems merely gener-
ate a false sense of security, while also intruding into our privacy and negatively impacting
other fundamental rights.
3 Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
Cognitive maps were first proposed by Axelrod [4] as a tool for modeling political deci-
sions, then extended by Kosko [34, 35] by introducing fuzzy values. A large number of
applications of fuzzy cognititive maps (FCM) were reported, e.g. in project risk modeling
[39], crisis management and decision making, analysis of development of economic systems
and the introduction of new technologies [32], academic units development [57], ecosys-
tem analysis [44], signal processing and decision support in medicine. A survey on Fuzzy
Cognitive Maps and their applications can be found in [2] and [45].
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FCMs are directed graphs whose vertices represent concepts, whereas edges are used to
express causal relations between them. A set of concepts C = {c1, . . . , cn} appearing in
a model encompasses events, conditions or other relevant factors. A system state is an n-
dimensional vector of concept activation levels (n = |C|) that can be real values belonging
to [0, 1] or [−1, 1].
Causal relations between concepts are represented in FCM by edges and assigned
weights. A positive weight of an edge linking two concepts ci and cj models a situa-
tion, where an increase of the level of ci results in a growing cj ; a negative weight is
used to describe the opposite rapport. In the simplest form of FCM, the values from the
set {−1, 0, 1} are used as weights. They are graphically represented as a minus (−) sign
attached to an edge, an absence of edge or a plus (+) sign. While building FCM models,
more fine-grained causal relations can be introduced. They are usually specified as lin-
guistic values, e.g.: strong negative, negative, medium negative, neutral, medium positive,
positive, strong positive and in a computational model they are mapped on values uniformly
distributed over [−1, 1].
A representation of FCM that used during reasoning is an n × n influence matrix E =
[eij ], whose elements eij have values equal to weights assigned to edges linking ci and cj
or are equal 0 values, if there is no link between them.
Figure 1 gives an example of an FCM graph, whose vertices were assigned with concepts
c1, c2, c3 and c4, whereas the edges were assigned with linguistic weights defining mutual
influences. Corresponding E matrix is defined by (1). The selection of values corresponding
to linguistic values is arbitrary; in the example the values: −1, −0.66, −0.33, 0, 0.33, 0.66




0 0 0 0
1 0 0 −0.33
0.66 0.33 0 0
0 0.66 −1 0
⎤
⎦ (1)
Reasoning with FCM consists in building a sequence of states:
α = A(0), A(1), . . . , A(k), . . .
starting from an initial vector of activation levels of concepts. Consecutive elements are




















Fig. 1 An example of FCM graph. Vertices are assigned with concepts, directed arcs with linguistic weights
of specifying influence
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by the influence matrix E, then the resulting activation levels of concepts are mapped onto
the assumed range by means of an activation (or splashing) function.








The selection of the activation function depends on assumptions regarding the calculation
model, in particular the selected range and the decision to use continuous or discrete values.
Multiplication of an n-dimensional square matrix E, both containing elements whose abso-
lute values are bounded by 1, results in a vector having elements in [−n, n]. Values from
this interval should be mapped by an activation function into the range [−1, 1] (or [0, 1])
preserving monotonicity and satisfying S(0) = 0 (or S(0) = 0.5 in the second case.)




−1, if x < −1
+x, if x ≥ −1 and x ≤ 1




1 − exp(−mx), if x ≥ 0
−1 + exp(−mx), if x < 0 (4)
Stanh(x) = exp(mx) + exp(−mx)
exp(mx) − exp(−mx) (5)
Function Scut (x) given by (3) maps arguments into the interval [−1, 1] replacing values
laying outside the interval by the lower or upper bound. Function Sexp(x) has similar shape
to do Scut (x), but more smoothed and flattened, what is controlled by the coefficient m
typically having a value ranging from 1 to 5. Function Stanh(x) is a modification of the
hyperbolic tangent consisting in introducing m coefficient (5) that allows to adjust the curve
slope.
Basically, a sequence of consecutive states α = A(0), A(1), . . . , A(k), . . . is infinite.
However, it was shown that after k iterations, where k is a number close to the rank of matrix
E, a steady state is reached or a cycle occurs. Hence, the stop criterion for the reasoning
algorithm in the k step is the following:
∃j < k : d(A(k),A(j)) < , (6)
where d is a distance and  a small value, e.g. 10−2.
A sequence of states α can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it can be treated as a
representation of a dynamic behavior of the modeled system. In this case there exist implicit
temporal relations between consecutive system states and the whole sequence describes
an evolution of the system in the form of a scenario. Under the second interpretation the
sequence represents a non-monotonic fuzzy inference process, in which selected elements
of a steady state are interpreted as reasoning results. An occurrence of a cycle can be treated
as a form of undecidability.
In this paper FCMs are considered to be a tool for risks modeling and the focus is put on
the second approach.
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4 Methodology of risk assessment
The methodology for risk assessment comprises basic steps common to various standards
and guidelines, see [24, 31, 38, 46]. The salient difference is the use of an FCM model
capturing influences between assets and allowing their dependencies to be tracked during a
risk aggregation.
The assumed conceptual model (Fig. 2) assigns an abstract utility value to an asset and
organizes assets into the added value tree, a hierarchical structure, in which components
of a lower level deliver value to parent elements. The top of the tree is occupied by key
processes; they are identified according to business drivers. The utilities of processes depend
on used data and invoked services. Various data sources including software may contribute
to the utility of data. Services depend on software, hardware and communication, but also
on involved staff, physical infrastructure (buildings, rooms, electricity) and external services
(e.g. Public Key Infrastructure).
Utility values assigned to assets can be interpreted as aggregations of various quality
attributes: security, reliability, usability, etc. Changes of utility values assigned to lower-
level assets influence higher-level components that use them.
The risk model presented in Fig. 3 assumes that the utility of an asset can be compro-
mised by a threat, which decreases its value. A negative influence of a threat on an asset
can be compensated by an appropriate countermeasure. Countermeasures themselves do not
add value to the utility, they only reduce the risk.
For evaluation purposes we define
• utility assigned to assets as a value from range [−1, 1]
• risk related to an asset as the negative difference between assumed utility and the value
calculated at the end of the reasoning process.
The reasoning process takes into account influences of threats and countermeasures directly








CommunicationHardware System SoftwareData Source Software
Configuration Data
Fig. 2 Classes of assets appearing in an added value tree and their influences





Fig. 3 Relations between assets, threats and countermeasures
The proposed risk assessment process comprises six steps briefly discussed below.
1. Identification of assets. The input for this step are existent documents specifying a
system vision, its operational concept and an architecture, but also interviews with
designers and development teams. The outcome is a list of assets identifying key
processes, services, data, software modules, hardware, communication, providers of
external data and services, involved people and physical premises.
2. Building added value trees. This step aims at making an assessment of how lower-level
assets contribute to higher-level ones (see Fig. 2). Technically, the obtained added value
tree is represented by an FCM influence matrix.
3. Identification of threats. For this purpose a general taxonomy of threats, e.g. an avail-
able ontology can be used and customized to the case analyzed. We use an asset-based
model of threats, i.e. we identify threats that are related to a particular asset.
4. Risk assessment for individual assets. As a basic tool we use a questionnaire, in which
various involved stakeholders reply to questions concerning the applied countermea-
sures. A list of standard countermeasures reflecting the best practices in the field of IT
security is used and adapted to a particular set of assets. The outcome of this phase is
an assignment of risk values (real numbers normalized to the interval [0, 1]) to assets.
5. Risk aggregation. This step consists of an FCM reasoning aiming at establishing how
risks assigned to low-level assets accumulate to yield risk profiles of high-level assets.
6. Interpretation of results. In particular, this step may include what if analyses. If an
application of additional countermeasures at various levels of individual assets is
assumed, then step 5 is repeated.
5 Presentation of the SIMPOZ system
SIMPOZ project aims at building a highly configurable video surveillance system utilizing
recent results of research on intelligent video analysis [10, 22, 43, 59], real-time video
processing [36, 37] and image understanding [62, 63]. SIMPOZ is an acronym of the Polish
project name that can be translated as: System of Intelligent Monitoring of Objects and Areas
of Special Importance.
The project is divided into two phases: during the first of them, dedicated to development,
the system components were built and a prototype instance serving as a proof-of-concept
was integrated. The goal of the next phase is to provide an industrial deployment by
reconfiguring and integrating the implemented earlier components. The deployment is to
be performed by a company specialized in video surveillance installations. Currently, the
development phase is completed and the deployment has just started. Hence, it is a perfect
moment to perform evaluation of the system IT risks.
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Video detection components within SIMPOZ system provide several monitoring func-
tions [14]: violation of protected zones, detection of movement in a forbidden direction,
object abandonment, theft, loitering, crowd gathering, vandalism (graffiti and devastation)
and fight. Trajectory collision detection is a special feature dedicated to protection of
such facilities as airports. In the delivered prototype and the first planned deployment we
focused on three functions: zone violation and movement detection, object abandonment
and trajectory collision.
As the developed system provides a number of components to be configured and tailored
to specific needs, it necessitates in an integration platform. This role in SIMPOZ is assigned
to a workflow subsystem. The workflow executes processes triggered by various events, for
example an alarm occurrence or a user request. The processes coded in XPDL language
define sequences of operations resulting in information flows, e.g. from video detector to
operator station and alarm database, then to members of an intervention group or a security
officer. A set of workflow participants or plugged in components can be flexibly chosen.
Moreover, new processes can be easily defined to support end-user needs. Examples of
processes elaborated for a prototype implementation can be found in [58].
Figure 4 shows the architecture of the SIMPOZ system. Video detectors perform surveil-
lance tasks. Each of them has a certain degree of freedom in communicating with the
rest of system using specialized interfaces designed in line with SOA (Service Oriented
Architecture) approach. Information about an event detection triggers appropriate response
procedures (written in XPDL language) executed by a workflow engine.
Video camera streams are registered by the Video Server. Registered material is protected
by watermarking against forging. It can be used for preparing evidence data at request of
law enforcement agencies.
Fig. 4 Architecture of the SIMPOZ system
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Operator station gives access to monitoring information, which comes from various types
of detectors and running processes. In the case, when a suspicious situation is detected or an
alarm is generated, the information about the event is passed to the operator. The operator
can also communicate with intervention groups and other parties. In order to better assess
the situation, current and archive video streams can be checked.
Interfaces of signaling devices allow processes managed by the workflow system to com-
municate with them and other elements of building automation systems (i.e. sirens, displays,
emergency exit, illumination, floodgate, HVAC, etc.).
Mobile devices support communication between operators and members of interven-
tion groups. Within designed processes, they are used for sending confirmation of the call
reception and for reporting current status of an intervention.
External communication interfaces allow for sending automatic notification to emer-
gency services (police, army, fire department) relevant to the detected danger. They can be
also used to notify selected users about alarm situation with such means as SMS or e-mail.
The Alarm DB database records information on detected alarms and other events,
e.g. operator decisions and messages sent. Their history is stored in Analysis&Reports
Warehouse, which can be queried by Reports software tools.
The system includes also Process Definition Repository, Resource Repository, Active
Directory providing basic authorization functions and Audit Repository storing a logged
history of all processes executed by the workflow engine
As it can be observed, the workflow component participates in almost every informa-
tion flow. Due to performance reasons, the video streams (from camera to operator station
and videoserver) and ETL (feeding Analysis&Reports Warehouse) flow directly between
components.
6 Risk analysis for the SIMPOZ system
In this section we perform risk analysis for SIMPOZ system according to the methodol-
ogy defined in Section 4. It should be noted, that the system being assessed has not been
deployed yet. The advantage of such analysis is that high risk areas, e.g. related to miss-
ing software functions can be earlier detected and corrected before the final transition. On
the other hand, the disadvantage is that in many cases it is necessary to make an edu-
cated guess, for example to assume that that certain security standards and practices would
be preserved during deployment realized by a professional company specialized in CCTV
installations.
While selecting the scope of the risk analysis, we decided to include three areas: IT
security, understood as protection against adversarial actions and accidental leak of sensi-
tive data, business continuity that can be mapped on such quality attributes as reliability
and availability of services and protection against operational incidents, such as errors in
data or process execution. For a video surveillance system, they can stem from erroneous
classification, software failures, camera configuration and unmotivated or untrained staff.
6.1 Identification of assets
The first step of the risk assessment was performed within two brainstorming sessions,
in which the members of the project development team participated. During the sessions,
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existent project documents and architectural views were analyzed and discussed. As the
result more then 70 assets divided into 10 groups were identified:
1. Key processes: Restricted zone violation&response, Abandoned object detec-
tion&response, Trajectory collision detection&response, Reporting and Evidence col-
lection. We have considered only those processes, which were implemented (designed
and coded in XPDL language) in the prototype system.
2. Services: Serv. Zone surveillance, Serv. Abandonned object, Serv. Trajectory, VD con-
figuration, Video storage&watermarking, Alarm data storage, Streaming and LDAP
(security).
3. External services: SMS notification, E-mail notification, Police WS, Medical WS and
Fire brigades WS.
4. Infrastructure services: Process execution, Service execution, Process repositories,
Active Directory and Auditing.
5. Data: Stored video, Alarm data, Configuration data camera, Configuration data VD
and Reports.
6. Software modules: Operator station, VD zone surveillance, VD abandonned object,
VD trajectory, VD configuration, Alarm DB, Streaming (video repository), Reporting
& Analysis, Mobile application.
7. Hardware: Indoor camera, Outdoor camera, VD processor, Operator workstation,
Workflow server, Alarm DB server, Video server, Warehouse server, Smartphone, and
Network infrastructure.
8. Communication: Camera-VD, Camera-Operator Workstation, Intranet, Extranet
(https) and Other.
9. People: Operator, Administrator, Camera maintenance, Process developer, Interven-
tion group member Security officer and Management.
10. Infrastructure provided by a third party (communications, electricity).
6.2 Building added value tree
The assets identified in the previous step constitute a network of dependent elements, i.e.
the processes depend on services that are provided by software and hardware modules and
refer to data which is stored and exchanged within the system as shown in Fig. 2. Influ-
ences between assets were identified based on architectural views, but particular weights
were established during interviews with software architects and developers. They were then
described in the form of an FCM influence matrix, using the following linguistic values:
high, significant, medium, low and none.
To give an example, the utility of the Restricted zone violation process is highly influ-
enced by the service Serv. Zone surveillance, significantly by VD configuration, at medium
level by LDAP (security). External services have low influences and from the data group:
Alarm data has significant influence on the process. Analogous statements were made for
all assets.
The resulting influence matrix E is usually very sparse. As during the assessment about
70 assets were considered, E has about 5000 elements, however, only 295 non-zero influ-
ences were indicated including default 1s at the matrix diagonal. Figure 5 shows probably
the most dense part of the established matrix.
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Fig. 5 Partial influence matrix. Linguistic terms high, significant, medium, low and none are mapped to
values: 1.0, 0.75, 0.50, 0.25 and 0 respectively
6.3 Threats
The identification of threats was based on available sources, e.g. [24, 38, 46], as well as on
previous experience. The elicited list of threats to be considered in a vulnerability analysis
comprised 62 elements grouped in twelve families corresponding to classes of assets.
The families are: Process (e.g bad design), Software (e.g. quality failures, lack of
maintenance, malware), Hardware (quality failures, resource exhaustion), Communications
(protocol weakness, service disruption), Data (confidentiality or integrity breach), External
services (loss of PKI, SMS gate, PaaS, SaaS), Physical infrastructure (premises, electricity,
air condition), People, Natural conditions, Economical conditions and Legal.
We maintain a set of threats as a reusable ontology formalized in OWL language. Figure 6
shows the taxonomy of threats applicable to the SIMPOZ system. (The presented tree view
comes from the Prote´ge´ ontology editor.)
6.4 Risk assessment for individual assets
This step in the risk assessment process combines two activities identified in various
methodologies, namely: the analyses of vulnerabilities and of effectiveness of countermea-
sures. Technically, the assessment is performed using questionnaires, in which answers
reflecting best practices are attributed with weights describing their influence on a risk
profile.
In the case of the SIMPOZ system, we used a questionnaire comprising about 190
questions divided into 12 groups of threats and countermeasures.
A logical structure of a sample questionnaire related to the video detector (VD) is pre-
sented in Table 1. For each question (a security feature), at most three answers (ratings)
were defined. The answers were attributed with weights qij ∈ [0, 1] that can be interpreted
as their impact on the asset’s risk profile. The weights are assigned after a voting process
(questionnaires for the given asset type are prepared in advance and they represent “best
practices”). Moreover, the influences of features can be differentiated with weight wi shown
in the last column of the table. These weights are not visible to the interrogated members of
the development team, software architects and other involved stakeholders. The values that
are underlined in Table 1 represent the answers for the SIMPOZ system.
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Fig. 6 Taxonomy of threats identified for the SIMPOZ system
It should be observed, that a questionnaire defines in fact a structure of a Fuzzy Cognitive
Map, in which weights express influences. Moreover, they were selected in a voting process,
which is a typical practice of an FCM construction.
The risk RAs for an asset s is calculated with the formula (7) based on the values of
answers aij to ks questions Qi , i = 1, . . . , ks . Values 1 and 0 are used for positive and













The normalization factor W in formula (7) plays an analogous role as an activation
function in (2).
To illustrate the calculations, the answers to the questionnaire obtained during the inter-
view with the project development team were marked in Table 1 by using underlined, bold
font. The application of formula (7) yields the value 0.355, which indicates that threats are
not fully neutralized by countermeasures (which would hold, if the calculated value were
equal to 0). The values resulting from the questionnaires relating to particular assets were
then used in the next step aiming at the calculation of aggregated risks.
6.5 Calculation of aggregated risk with FCM
The calculations were preceded by a normalization of the matrix of influences. While
preparing the matrix we used five linguistic variables to describe influence: high, significant,
medium, low and none. Then, they were mapped to weights {1.0, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0} and for
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0, if eij = 0





exp(m · eij ) and m is a positive constant (in the calculations the value
m = 1.0 was used) and eij describes an influence of i low-level assets on j a high-level
asset.
Such normalization gives a probability distribution. Motivation for assuming the assumed
distribution stems from the Game Theory. Suppose, that a high-level asset ah depends on
low-level assets al1 , . . . , alk , with influences ehl1 , . . . , ehl1 . If a threat agent treated as an
adversarial player is to select a low-level asset to launch an attack on, it should choose
an element alm giving the highest influence ehlm on the risk profile of ah. However, the
player can make errors in an estimation of influences. Resulting probability of adversarial
actions depends on distribution of errors, which, in general, is difficult to track. However,
assuming a double exponential distribution of errors, we arrive at a logit model [3] given by
the formula (8).
For the final calculation of aggregated risks two sequences of vectors were constructed:
αnr = Anr(0), . . . , Anr(i), . . .
and
αr = Ar(0), . . . , Ar(i), . . .
by successively applying an FCM state equation (2).
The no-risk sequence αnr starts with a vector Anr(0), in which all elements expressing
the utility of assets are set to 1. For the risk sequence αr the initial vector Ar(0) is the
difference of vectors of asset utilities Anr(0) and related risks RA established in the previous
phase, using formula (7): Ar(0) = Anr(0) − RA.
Finally, by subtracting the corresponding elements of αnr and αr we obtain a sequence
of aggregated risk values
ρ = R(0), . . . , R(i), . . . ,
where R(i) = Anr(i) − Ar(i). This sequence converges to values that express aggregated
risks for all assets at different levels of the added value tree.
Values of aggregated risks for high-level assets: processes, services and data are pre-
sented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively. For comparison, risk levels obtained by using three
activation functions: Scut , Sexp and Stanh defined by formulas (3), (4) and (5) are reported.
Table 2 Aggregated risks for processes
Risk - Scut Risk - Sexp Risk - Stanh
Process calc. max calc. max calc. max
Restricted zone violation 0.1859 0.5640 0.0156 0.0868 0.0277 0.1657
Abandoned object detection 0.1788 0.5536 0.0148 0.0831 0.0263 0.1590
Trajectory collision detection 0.1943 0.5699 0.0170 0.0892 0.0304 0.1700
Reporting 0.1564 0.4609 0.0121 0.0593 0.0210 0.1123
Evidence collection 0.1417 0.4475 0.0118 0.0534 0.0205 0.1022
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Table 3 Aggregated risks for services
Risk - Scut Risk - Sexp Risk - Stanh
Process calc. max calc. max calc. max
Serv. Zone surveillance 0.2041 0.6424 0.0166 0.1071 0.0292 0.2058
Serv. Abandonned object 0.2041 0.6424 0.0166 0.1071 0.0292 0.2058
Serv. Trajectory 0.2546 0.6785 0.0254 0.1246 0.0469 0.2345
VD configuration 0.2380 0.6626 0.0225 0.1241 0.0411 0.2321
Video storage & watermarking 0.1184 0.4161 0.0082 0.0436 0.0136 0.0850
Alarm data storage 0.1165 0.3967 0.0081 0.0405 0.0134 0.0785
Streaming 0.1210 0.4479 0.0084 0.048 0.0140 0.0942
LDAP (security) 0.1150 0.419 0.0080 0.0442 0.0131 0.0866
Each value given in calc. column is accompanied by its range (maximum level) in max
column. The later is determined by switching off safeguards. In some cases, however, e.g.
related to physical protection, we have made assumptions that a safeguard will be present.
The comparison indicates that qualitative results for all activation functions are quite
similar. Basically, higher risk levels are attributed to all services and processes involving
detection, i.e. Restricted zone violation, Abandoned object detection and Trajectory colli-
sion detection. It is quite natural, as they are influenced by more risk factors. From those,
Trajectory collision detection returned the highest risk. This reflects the fact that the cam-
era observing an outdoor scene is exposed to weather conditions, e.g. fog, snow, heavy rain,
which cannot be compensated.
6.6 Results of assessment
Our findings indicate acceptable level of aggregated risks related to assets placed at the
top of the utility tree (processes, data and services). The highest determined risks never
exceeded 40 % of the reference value, what places them at low or medium level.
Regardless of a method used, the benefit of making a risk assessment is that the whole
process involves asking questions related to architectural decisions. In consequence, several
suggestions for improvements can be made, what in turn, may decrease risks.
Table 4 Aggregated risks for data
Risk - Scut Risk - Sexp Risk - Stanh
Process calc. max calc. max calc. max
Stored video - utility 0.1045 0.4386 0.0072 0.0464 0.0119 0.0910
Stored video - confidentiality 0.1045 0.4386 0.0072 0.0464 0.0119 0.0910
Alarm data 0.1247 0.5042 0.0087 0.0568 0.0145 0.1137
Configuration data camera 0.1247 0.5042 0.0087 0.0568 0.0145 0.1137
Configuration data VD 0.1247 0.5042 0.0087 0.0568 0.0145 0.1137
Reports 0.1364 0.4263 0.0096 0.0445 0.0160 0.0870
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During the analysis several problems were found. Limited by the paper space, we focus
on issues pertaining to the Videodetector, which was discussed in Section 6.4.
1. Lack of heartbeat function may cause that a VD failure may be not noticed for a long
time. We suggested to add this functionality, moreover to designate a server that would
keep track of states of all video detectors.
2. Although a watchdog implementing self-restart was implemented, such event is not
logged. Hence, there is no information on the frequency of failures. After the VD
system is restarted, the detection algorithms build their background models. In conse-
quence, during at least 90 seconds the scene is unattended. If the restart frequency is
high, e.g. 20 times a day, the total time, during which automatic video analysis can be
not effective can reach 30 minutes. It was proposed to save the background model on a
regular basis. In case of restarting, last saved background model can be used.
3. Videodetector does not implement a testing mode. Hence, false alarms can be generated
or it may happen that an operator is not informed after the test were completed.
Suggested implementation of the heartbeat function, restart logging and testing mode for
the Videodetector may decrease the risk calculated according to the questionnaire in Table 1
from 0.355 to 0.139. This what would significantly improve the risk assigned to detection
functions within the system.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we study an application of a a new method for risk assessment of IT sys-
tems based on Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. It was originally developed to establish risks for a
telemedicine system [60, 61], however, our intention was to make it general enough, to be
applied to a variety of IT systems. The method include steps present in various standards and
methodologies: identification of assets, threats, analysis of vulnerabilities and effectiveness
of countermeasures, however, it relies on FCM reasoning to calculate risks. A cornerstone of
the proposed method is added value tree expressing dependencies between assets. A salient
feature of the method is, that it uses an abstract term utility (and a loss of utility caused by a
threat) in place of financial loss. This makes the method applicable for IT system, for which
financial loss is difficult to estimate.
The methodology presented in the paper is general, however the focus on a particular
system or a class of systems is implemented in the step 4: Risk assessment for individual
assets. The assessment is based on a list of questions related to implemented countermea-
sures (reflecting best practices in the field) which are specific to the system type. The list of
questions, together with their influences on a risk profile are prepared by domain experts in
a kind of a voting process. Moreover, such list can be reused during assessment of another
systems (from a given domain/class).
In this paper the authors make two major contributions. Firstly, the problem of IT security
assessment for a video surveillance system is tackled. As it was indicated in Section 2.3, till
now this topic has been addressed by merely a few papers. Secondly, an application of the
risk assessment method to a new class of IT system is described.
Following the method guidelines, the tasks performed during risk assessment were as
follows: preparing lists of assets based on architectural views and interviews, building influ-
ence matrix reflecting an added value tree, identifying threats, calculating non-aggregated
risks related to assets with use of questionnaires based on best practices and finally per-
forming reasoning with FCM techniques. It should be mentioned, that the analyzed video
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surveillance system was far more complex that the example discussed in [61], as it combined
various technologies: video detection, workflow and database management. Moreover, the
number of assets, which were considered during evaluation, doubled.
An important result of the performed risk assessment was the proposal of several small
extensions and functions that might be introduced to ameliorate the developed system. In
spite the fact, that the suggested changes were not so much extensive, they significantly
improved the system reliability and robustness.
Another advantage of the method is that the prepared risk assessment questionnaires
(c.f. Table 1) related to various types of assets can be reused for various system deployments.
In case of changes or new system instances only last steps of the risk analysis (filling in
questionnaires and performing risk aggregation) are required.
The proposed method can be considered as a lightweight approach to risk assessment,
suitable for small and medium size systems [60]. In the case of the SIMPOZ system, the
data was collected during five interviews and brainstorming sessions, in the meantime ques-
tionnaires used in previous analyzes by the assessment team were adapted to reflect specific
assets and threats.
Lessons learned indicate, that the proposed method is an efficient and low-cost approach,
giving instantaneous feedback and enabling reasoning on effectiveness of a security system.
It can be considered as an alternative to heavy assessment processes defined by standards.
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